Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of FreeWill in the Light of Quantum Mechanics. by Stapp, Henry & Stapp, Henry P
 1
Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of Free Will in the Light 
of Quantum Mechanics. 
 
 
Henry P. Stapp 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
University of California 
Berkeley, California 94720 
 
                                                   Abstract 
 
Arguments pertaining to the mind-brain connection and to the physical 
effectiveness of our conscious choices have been presented in two recent 
books, one by John Searle, the other by Jaegwon Kim. These arguments are 
examined, and it is argued that the difficulties encountered arise from a 
defective understanding and application of a pertinent part of contemporary 
science, namely quantum mechanics. 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The central problem in philosophy of mind is the mind-body problem: the 
problem of reconciling our science-based understandings of the causal 
structure of the physically described world, including our bodies and brains, 
with the apparent capacity of our conscious thoughts and efforts to cause our 
bodies to move in consciously intended ways. 
 
The contention of the present work is that the difficulties that philosophers 
of mind are encountering in coming to a satisfactory resolution of this 
problem arise from a faulty understanding and application of a relevant part 
of contemporary science, namely quantum mechanics. Philosophy of mind is 
a vast field, so to make my task manageable I shall limit my remarks to the 
opinions and arguments presented in two recent books, John Searle’s 
Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and 
Political Power1, and Jaegwon Kim’s Physicalism, or Something Near 
Enough2. 
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2. Searle’s Approach. 
 
John Searle begins Section 1 of his book with the assertion: “There is 
exactly one overriding question in contemporary philosophy…As a 
preliminary succinct formulation we could put it in these terms: How do we 
fit in?” He explains that: “We now have a reasonable well-established 
conception of the basic structure of the universe.” “We understand that the 
universe consists entirely of particles (or whatever entities the ultimately 
true physics arrives at), and these exist in fields of force and are typically 
organized into systems.” He observes that:  “On our earth, carbon-based 
systems made of molecules that also contain a lot of hydrogen, nitrogen and 
oxygen have provided the substrate of human, animal and plant evolution”, 
and says that: “These and other such facts about the basic structure of the 
universe, I will call, for short, the ‘basic facts’ . The most important sets of 
basic facts, for our present purposes, are given in the atomic theory of matter 
and the evolutionary theory of biology.”  
 
These statements identify the foundation and orientation of Searle’s 
approach: We human beings are biological systems made of atoms and 
molecules, and our complete understanding of ourselves should therefore 
emerge from an analysis of our understandings of our biological structures, 
which rest in turn on the atomic theory of matter. 
  
Searle notes that his approach rests also on an important difference between 
what is possible in philosophy today and what was feasible in the past. He 
notes that “For three centuries after Descartes, the epistemological questions, 
especially the skeptical questions, formed the center of philosophical 
interest. (p.26)” That quest can now be ended because “We simply know too 
much. We have a prodigious amount of knowledge that is known with 
objectivity, certainty, and universality. … They are known with certainty, in 
the sense that the evidence is now so great that it is irrational to doubt 
them.”(p. 27)” Searle thus escapes the search-for-certainty dead end by 
accepting the above-mentioned ‘basic facts’. 
 
Searle observes that we have, however, in addition to the ‘basic facts’  also a 
conception of ourselves as conscious, intentionalistic, rational, …free will 
possessing agents,” and he identifies the question to be addressed by his 
book--which is also the topic of this article--as: “How can we square this 
self-conception of ourselves as mindful, meaning-creating, free, rational, 
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etc., agents with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, 
unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles.(p.5)” 
 
Two key problems facing this endeavor are “consciousness” and “free will”. 
Searle claims to have solved the philosophical problem of consciousness by 
asserting that “Conscious states are entirely caused by neuronal processes in 
the brain, and are realized in the brain.” The residual problems of 
consciousness are thereby relegated to neurobiology: “How exactly does the 
brain cause conscious experiences, and how are those experiences realized in 
the brain.” (p.6) 
 
3. Free Will. 
 
The free-will problem is “How can there exist genuinely free actions in a 
world where all events, at least at the macro level, apparently have causally 
sufficient antecedent conditions? Every event at that level appears to be 
determined by causes that preceded it. Why should acts performed during 
apparent human consciousness of freedom be an exception? It is true that 
there is an indeterminacy in nature at the quantum level, but that 
indeterminacy is pure randomness and randomness is not by itself sufficient 
to give free will.” (p. 10-11) 
 
Searle admits that for the problem of free will “we are nowhere remotely 
near having a solution.” (p.11) 
 
Why is solving the problem of free will so important?  
 
The useful practical purpose of philosophy is to arrive at a coherent 
understanding of how we fit in, in order that we may conduct our lives in 
accordance with principles not beset with contradictions. Searle makes a 
convincing case (p.11) that we must, in order to function rationally in this 
world, believe that we are sometimes free to choose our actions. To deny 
this would create a self-contradiction. But without resolving the problem of 
free will, philosophy loses its rational coherence, and men will turn to other 
sources for the foundations of their beliefs.  
 
The importance of arriving at a solution of the free-will problem is 
highlighted also by recent controlled studies3 that show that experimental 
subjects conditioned by arguments that promote the thesis that we have no 
free will, that free will is an illusion, that mind is epiphenomenal, are more 
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likely to cheat and lie than subjects conditioned by arguments defending the 
thesis that the freedom that we feel is bona fide. Hence, again, achieving a 
solution of the free-will problem has important consequences in our lives.. 
This motivates our taking a closer look at Searle’s arguments and the 
difficulties that they create for solving the free-will problem. 
   
Searle, following his neurobiological approach, must explain how free will 
can be converted to a problem in neurobiology. He considers two hypotheses 
(p.61-73): 
 
Hypothesis 1: The neurobiological state of the brain is causally sufficient to 
determine the behavior of the brain, hence the body. In this case, the feeling 
of freedom to choose some of our action is an illusion! Consciousness lacks 
causal efficacy. It is purely epiphenomenal. Searle emphasizes that this idea-
--that nature has provided us with this fantastic feature, consciousness, that 
seems to play an essential role in the successful conduct of our lives, but that 
actually does nothing---is “unattractive” (p.70).  He emphasizes the great 
biological cost of producing the machinery needed to create consciousness. 
The suggestion that the output of this costly biological process has no 
physical effect is hard to square with evolutionary theory. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The neurobiological state of the brain is causally insufficient 
to determine the behavior of the brain, and this causal gap allows our 
conscious choices to influence our conduct in the way that they seem to do, 
namely on the basis of choices based on reasons. He argues that “reasons” 
can fulfill the role of sufficient conditions only by way of influencing our 
deliberating, choosing, and physically efficacious conscious “selves”. 
 
The demand that neurobiological state of the brain is causally insufficient to 
determine the ongoing behavior of the brain entails the failure of one of the 
chief properties of classical physical theories, the causal closure of the 
physically described aspects of nature. Searle says: “It is tempting, indeed 
irresistible, to think that the explanation of the conscious experience of free 
will must be a manifestation of quantum indeterminism at the level of 
conscious, rational decision making.  Previously I never could see the point 
of introducing quantum mechanics into the discussion of consciousness. But 
here is at least a strict argument requiring the introduction of quantum 
indeterminism. 
 
 
 5
Premise 1. All indeterminism in nature is quantum indeterminism. 
 
Premise 2. Consciousness is a feature of nature that manifests 
indeterminism. 
 
Conclusion: Consciousness manifests quantum indeterminism. 
 
“….This [conclusion] is important for contemporary research. The standard 
lines of research…make no appeal to quantum mechanics. If Hypothesis 2 is 
true these cannot succeed, at least not for volitional consciousness.” (p.75) 
 
He goes on: “If quantum indeterminism amounts to randomness then 
quantum indeterminism by itself seems useless in explaining the problem of 
free will because free actions are not random.” The point here is that we 
need an explanation not only of the failure of physical determinism, but an 
explanation also of the filling of that causal gap by our “free” choices based 
on reasons. 
 
Summarizing, he says: “Once we sorted out the issues we found two 
possibilities, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Neither is very appealing. If 
we had to bet, the odds would surely favor Hypothesis 1, because it is 
simpler and fits with our overall view of biology. But it gives results that are 
literally incredible.” (One cannot literally believe that oneself cannot make 
choices.) But “Hypothesis 2 is a mess, because it gives us three mysteries for 
one. We thought free will was a mystery, but consciousness and quantum 
mechanics were two separate and distinct mysteries. Now we have the result 
that in order to solve the first we have to solve the second and invoke one of 
the most mysterious aspects of the third to solve the first two.” 
 
4. The Three Mysteries. 
 
But who could think that these three “mysteries” were separate and distinct? 
 
With regard to the connection between free will and mind, William James 
asserted, near the beginning of The Principles of Psychology4, 
 
“The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their 
attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of 
mentality in a phenomenon”. (James, p.8) 
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“No actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of 
means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind”. (James, p.10) 
 
Thus, for James, mind is fundamentally tied to the choice of a means to an 
end. On the other hand, the solution that Searle offered long ago to the mind-
brain problem did not touch on free will. It said simply: “Conscious states 
are entirely caused by neuronal processes in the brain, and are realized in the 
brain.” He notes, as mentioned above, that this philosophical solution 
relegates to neurobiology the residual questions: “How exactly does the 
brain cause conscious experiences?” “How are those experiences realized in 
the brain.”  And he admits that contemporary mainstream neurobiology is 
nowhere near solving these residual questions. Indeed, insofar as 
neurobiology bases itself purely on classical mechanics, it lacks any logical 
or theoretical basis to link the empirically observed correlations between 
conscious experiences and brain behavior to any notion of how this 
classically conceived physically described brain could cause to occur events 
having the knowingness and feelingness that characterize our conscious 
experiences.  There is nothing in the classical conception of physically 
described matter that could cause (even) a complex classically conceived 
high-level systems property to embellish itself, or endow itself, with an 
experience of knowing or feeling. Such a causal capacity is not in the 
inventory of properties assigned to physically described systems by classical 
physics. The physically described aspects of systems, as conceived of in 
classical physics---unlike the physically described aspects of systems as 
conceived of in quantum mechanics---have been stripped of any necessary 
causal connection to knowings or feelings. The physical aspects are both 
causally and conceptually complete. Thus, insofar as the neurobiology that 
Searle contemplates is based fundamentally on the classical physics of the 
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, it is not true that the ‘basic facts’ 
entail a neurobiological solution of the mind-body problem of the kind that 
Searle asserts. There is a logical gap! A true ‘basic fact’ is that this classical 
conception of the physical is inadequate to explain the atomic properties 
upon which actual neurobiological structures are based. Because Searle has 
not incorporated the logical and causal structure of quantum mechanics into 
his conception of neurobiology, his claim to have solved even the purely 
philosophical part of the mind-body problem is not rationally justified: there 
is no rational reason to believe that a solution along classical lines is possible 
in a fundamentally non-classical universe, particularly since the orthodox 
quantum successor to classical physics involves the necessary introduction, 
into the basic dynamics, of actions  by agents; actions that are not specified 
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by the micro-physical laws, but that, within the theory, arise from free 
choices of means to attain intended ends. 
  
This flaw is implicit in Searle’s open-ended introductory proviso, i.e. “(or 
whatever entities the ultimately true physics arrives at).”   His arguments 
tacitly assume that these entities will be like “quarks” or other “mindless” 
entities, not like the mindful elements of our streams of consciousness. Yet 
Searle’s ‘basic facts’ include atomic theory, which was radically 
transformed during the twentieth century. Searle uses the new theory, 
quantum theory, in his analysis of free will.  However, the opening words of 
Bohr’s 1934 book  Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature5 are: “The 
task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and reduce it to 
order.” This idea is restated many times in many ways, for example as: “In 
our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of 
phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the 
multifold aspects of our experience. (p.18)” Werner Heisenberg’s famous 
expression of this point was: 
 
“The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles 
has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality 
concept but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that 
represents no longer the behavior of the particles but rather our 
knowledge of this behavior” (Heisenberg6 , p.100) 
 
These statements emphasize that the basic ontological realities of quantum 
theory are not physical particles, but rather increments in knowledge. They 
are conscious experiences occurring in streams of conscious experiences. 
The “physical description” of earlier (classical) physical theories is 
transformed in quantum mechanics to a mathematical structure that 
represents not  material particles but rather “potentia” (objective tendencies) 
for new knowledge-increasing events to occur in our streams of 
consciousness. Each such event is accompanied by a change in the 
mathematically described “potentia” for future events. This change renders 
the potentialities for future experiences consistent with the increased 
knowledge. The theory is therefore useful and testable because it directly 
predicts relationships between our experiences---between our conscious acts 
of knowing. 
 
Searle introduces, in connection with his analysis of free will, the 
indeterminacy aspect of quantum mechanics but not the other profoundly 
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relevant features just mentioned. On page 11 he says “It is true that there is 
an indeterminacy in nature at the quantum level, but that indeterminacy is 
pure randomness and randomness is not by itself sufficient to give free will.” 
 
While it is absolutely true that randomness is different from, and insufficient 
for, free will, which involves reason-based choices of means to attain 
intended ends, it is absolutely untrue that quantum indeterminism is pure 
randomness.  Bohr says: 
 
To my mind there is no alternative than to admit that, in this field of 
experience, we are dealing with individual phenomena and that our 
possibilities of handling the measuring instruments allow us only to 
make a choice between the different complementary types of 
phenomena that we want to study. (Bohr7, p.51) 
 
The freedom of experimentation,  … is fully retained and corresponds 
to the free choice of experimental arrangement for which the 
mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical formalism offers 
the appropriate latitude6.  (Bohr7, p. 71)    
 
This “appropriate latitude” “offered by the mathematical structure of the 
quantum mechanical formalism” is a key aspect of the indeterminism of 
quantum mechanics, but it is quite different from another aspect which is the 
“randomness”. The quantum mechanical approach rests on a postulated 
connection between two aspects of the scientific description of phenomena. 
One aspect is described in terms of the mathematical structure of the 
quantum mechanical formalism. The other aspect is described in terms of 
appearances: 
 
…we must recognize above all that, even when the phenomena 
transcend the scope of classical physics, the account of the 
experimental arrangements must be given in plain language, suitably 
supplemented by technical physical terminology. This is a simple 
logical demand, since the very word “experiment” refers to a situation 
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have 
learned. (Bohr7, p.72) 
 
Von Neumann8 formulated quantum mechanics in a mathematically and 
logically rigorous way. He gave the name “process 1” to the physically 
described counterpart of the “free choice of experimental arrangement” that 
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is described in terms of appearances/experiences.  A key feature of this 
choice, and hence of its process 1 physical counterpart, is that it is “free” in 
the specific sense that the quantum laws and rules place no conditions, 
statistical or otherwise, upon it! This choice is free of any known theoretical 
constraint! It is indeterminate. But the ‘random’ aspect comes in, logically, 
only after this process 1 physical action. The process 1 action specifies some 
particular partition of the prior physical state into a countable set of distinct 
possibilities. Orthodox quantum theory then asserts that some single one of 
the specified-by-process-1 distinct possibilities will occur, randomly. The 
“randomness” condition asserts that these occurrences of outcomes will be 
in accord with statistical weights that are specified by the quantum 
mechanical formalism. But the preceding partitioning of the prior collection 
of possibilities into a (countable) set of distinct possibilities is an 
indeterminate processes that according to orthodox quantum mechanics is 
not random, but is treated, rather, as a reason-based  choice of means to an 
end! The experimenter chooses between this set-up or that set-up on the 
basis of reasons! More generally, a person’s most consciously made choices 
appear to arise from reasons, and feelings, whereas, within quantum 
mechanics there is a logical need for similar choices that are not determined, 
even statistically, by the known laws of quantum mechanics. 
 
Von Neumann’s work allows our bodies and brains to be described in terms 
of the quantum mechanical formalism. This makes the two disparate 
descriptions---perceptual-intentional and quantum-mathematical---that occur 
in quantum mechanics identifiable with the two disparate descriptions 
occurring in the mind-body problem.  
 
What these features of quantum mechanics imply is that Searle’s basic idea 
that the “basic facts” entail “a universe that consists entirely of mindless, 
meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles” is grossly at odds 
with a universe containing ourselves in the way specified by quantum 
mechanics. The reduction to “brute physical particles” is a feature that 
emerges only in the classical approximation. 
 
Searle concludes (p.71) that “It seems to me that there are three conditions, 
in ascending order of difficulty, and an account of brain functioning in 
accord with Hypothesis 2 would have to explain how the brain meets these 
conditions.” 
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1. “Consciousness, as caused by neuronal processes and realized in 
neuronal systems, functions causally in moving the body.” 
  
2. “The brain causes and sustains the existence of a conscious self that is 
able to make rational decisions and carry them out in actions.” 
 
3. “The brain is such that the conscious self is able to make and carry out 
decisions in the gap, where neither decision nor action is determined 
in advance by causally sufficient conditions, yet both are rationally 
explained by the reasons the agent is acting on.” 
     
As regards condition 1, Searle claims that he has already explained how this 
is possible, by analogy with the Roger Sperry’s example of how the 
“solidity’ (a high-level property) allows the motion of the whole wheel to 
cause its molecules to move in a coordinated way, controlled from top-down 
by high-level collective properties. But he had already noted (p. 64) that: 
“any analogy goes only so far. The analogy solidity is to molecular behavior 
as consciousness is to neuronal behavior, in inadequate at, at least, two 
points. First, we take the wheel to be entirely deterministic, and ... second, 
the solidity of the wheel ontologically reducible to the behavior of the 
molecoles”, whereas neither of these conditions carry over to the Hypothesis 
2 case. Hence the basis of his earlier claim to have solved the consciousness 
(mind-body) problem disintegrates in the Hypothesis 2 case. There is no 
need, on the basis of the true ‘basic facts’, for consciousness to be (fully) 
caused by the brain, as the brain is described in quantum mechanics. 
 
As regards Searle’s condition 2, the quantum ontological foundation a a 
person’s stream of conscious experiences is no longer solely a classically 
conceived brain. The quantum mechanically conceived brain specifies only 
the potentialities/probabilities for certain psychophysical events to occur 
under the condition that certain associated reason-based psychologically 
described (process 1) choices have previously been made. These dual-aspect 
psychophysical events are the basic entities. The psychological description 
and the physical description specify two aspects (sides) of a single event-
type entity. The conscious self is a stream of conscious events. These events 
are the psychologically described aspects of a sequence of psychophysical 
events whose physical aspects are a sequence of physical events in a single 
brain. Mental process is to be understood in terms of this richer dualistic 
ontological base, rather than the impoverished purely physical part that 
survives contraction to the classical approximation. The quantum laws 
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specify nontrivial logical and causal connections between the mentally and 
physically described aspects of these events. 
 
The way that condition 3 is satisfied in quantum mechanics is an essentially 
technical matter involving details of the quantum mathematical formalism. 
The essential logical and mathematical structure is described in 
http://arXiv/abs/0803:1625 and 1633. Some of the less technical details are 
described below in sections 7 and 8. 
 
I turn next to a discussion of Kim’s arguments. 
 
5. Physicalism. 
 
The widely held philosophical position called “physicalism” has been 
described and defended in a recent book by Jaegwon Kim2. The physicalist 
claims that the world is basically purely physical. However, “physical” is 
interpreted in a way predicated, in effect, upon certain properties of classical 
physics that are contravened by the precepts of orthodox quantum physics. 
Kim’s arguments reveal two horns of a dilemma that the physicalist is forced 
to face as a consequence of accepting the classical notion of “physical”. Kim 
admits that neither of the two options, “epiphenomenalism” or “reduction”, 
is very palatable, but he finds a compromise that he deems acceptable.  
 
The central aim of the present article is to show that the physicalist’s 
dilemma dissolves when one shifts from the classical notion of the physical 
to its quantum mechanical successor. Understanding this shift involves 
distinguishing the quantum conception of the mind-brain from the shadow of 
itself that survives reduction to the classical approximation. 
 
To make clear the essential features of the quantum mechanical conception 
of the mind-brain connection, I shall describe here a model that is a specific 
realization of a theory I have described in more general terms before9-12. 
Being specific reduces generality, but having a concrete model can be 
helpful in revealing the general lay of the land. Also, the specific features 
added here resolve in a natural way the puzzle of how our descriptions of 
our observations can be couched in the language of classical physics when 
our brains are operating, fundamentally, in accordance with the principles of 
quantum theory. The specific model also shows how the thoroughly 
quantum mechanical (quantum Zeno) effect, which underlies the power of a 
person’s conscious thoughts to influence in intended ways the physically 
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described processes occurring in that person’s brain, is not appreciably 
disrupted either by “environmental decoherence” effects or by thermal 
effects arising from the “hotness” of the brain.   
 
In order to communicate to the broad spectrum of scientists and philosophers 
interested in the connection between mind and brain, and in the issue of free 
will, I will review in the following section the historical and conceptual 
background of the needed quantum mechanical ideas, and then describe an 
approach to the mind-body problem that is based fundamentally on quantum 
theory, but that adds several specific extra ideas about the form of the mind-
brain connection. 
 
6. Quantum Mechanics and Physicalism. 
 
Rather than just plunging ahead and using the concepts and equations of 
quantum mechanics, and thereby making this work unintelligible to many 
people that I want to reach, I am going to provide first an historical and 
conceptual review of the extremely profound changes in the philosophical 
and technical foundations that were wrought by the transition from classical 
physics to quantum physics. One key technical change was the shift from the 
numbers used in classical mechanics to describe properties of physical 
systems to the associated operators or matrices used to describe related 
actions. This technical shift emerged, unsought, from a seismic conceptual 
shift. Following the path blazed by Einstein’s success in creating special 
relativity, Heisenberg changed course. Faced with a quarter century of 
failures to construct a successful atomic theory based upon the notion of 
some presumed-to-exist space-time structure of the atom, Heisenberg 
attempted to build a theory based upon our observations and measurements, 
rather than upon conjectured microscopic space-time structures that could be 
postulated to exist, but that were never directly observed or measured. This 
shift in orientation led to grave issues concerning exactly what constituted an 
“observation” or “measurement”.   Those issues were resolved by shifting 
from an ontological perspective---which tries to describe what really exists 
objectively “out there”--- to a practical or pragmatic perspective, which 
regards a physical theory as a useful collective conceptual human endeavor 
that aims to provide us with reliable expectations about our future 
experiences, for each of the alternative possible courses of action between 
which we are (seemingly) free to choose. As a collective endeavor, and in 
that sense as an objective theory, quantum mechanics is built on descriptions 
that allow us to communicate to others what we have done and what we 
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have learned. Heisenberg strongly emphasized that this change in 
perspective converts the quantum mechanics, in a very real sense, into a 
theory about “our knowledge”: the relationships between experiential 
elements in our streams of consciousness become the core realities of a 
conceptual construction that aims to allow us to form, on the basis of what 
we already know, useful expectations about our future experiences, under 
the various alternative possible conditions between which we seem able to 
freely choose.  
 
The paradoxical aspect of claiming the “physical state of a system” to be a 
representation of “our knowledge” is starkly exhibited by “Schroedinger’s 
cat”, whose quantum state is, according to this pragmatic approach, not 
determined until someone looks. Bohr escapes this dilemma by saying that 
principles of his (Copenhagen) approach are insufficient to cover biological 
systems. But that limitation leaves quantum mechanics fundamentally 
incomplete, and, in particular, inapplicable to the physical processes 
occurring in our brains.  
 
In an effort to do better, von Neumann8 showed how to preserve the rules 
and precepts of quantum mechanics all the way up to the mind-brain 
interface, preserving the basic character of quantum mechanics as a theory 
that aims to provide reliable expectations about future experiences on the 
basis of present knowledge. Von Neumann’s work brings into sharp focus 
the central problem of interest here, which is the connection between the 
properties specified in the quantum mechanical description of a person’s 
brain and the experiential realities that populate that person’s stream of 
consciousness.  Bohr was undoubtedly right in saying that the Copenhagen 
precepts would be insufficient to cover this case. Additional ideas are 
needed, and the purpose of this article is to provide them.  
 
The switch from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics preserves the 
idea that a physical system has a physically describable state. But the 
character of that state is changed drastically. Previously the physical state 
was conceived to have a well defined meaning independently of any 
“observation”. Now the physically described state has essentially the 
character of a “potentia” (an “objective tendency”) for the occurrence of 
each one of a continuum of alternative possible “events”. Each of these 
alternative possible events has both an experientially described aspect and 
also a physically described aspect: each possible “event” is a psycho-
physical happening. The experientially described aspect of an event is an 
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element in a person’s stream of consciousness, and the physically described 
aspect is a reduction of the set of objective tendencies represented by the 
prior state of that person’s body-brain to the part of that prior state that is 
compatible with the increased knowledge supplied by the new element in 
that person’s stream of consciousness. Thus the changing psychologically 
described state of that person’s knowledge is correlated to the changing 
physically described state of the person’s body-brain, and the changing 
physically described state entails, via the fundamental quantum probability 
formula, a changing set of weighted possibilities for future psychophysical 
events.  
 
The practical usefulness of quantum theory flows from this lawful 
connection between a person’s increasing knowledge and the changing 
physical state of his body-brain. The latter is linked to the surrounding 
physical world by the dynamical laws of quantum physics. This linkage 
allows a person to “observe” the world about him by means of the lawful 
relationship between the events in his stream of conscious experiences and 
the changing state of his body-brain. 
 
It is worth noting that the physically described aspect of the theory has lost 
its character of being a “substance”, both in the philosophical sense that it is 
no longer self-sufficient, being intrinsically and dynamically linked to the 
mental, and also in the colloquial sense of no longer being material. It is 
stripped of materiality by its character of being merely a collection of 
potentialities or possibilities for future events.  This shift in its basic 
character renders the physical aspect somewhat idea-like, even though it is 
conceived to represent objectively real tendencies. 
 
The key “utility” property of the theory---namely the property of being 
useful---makes no sense, of course, unless we have, in some sense, some 
freedom to choose. An examination of the structure of quantum mechanics 
reveals that the theory has both a logical place for, and a logical need for, 
choices that are made in practice by the human actor/observers, but that are 
not determined by the quantum physical state of the entire world, or by any 
part of it.  Bohr calls this choice “the free choice of experimental 
arrangement for which the quantum mechanical formalism offers the 
appropriate latitude.”  (Bohr7, p.73). This “free” choice plays a fundamental 
role in von Neumann’s rigorous formulation of quantum mechanics, and he 
gives the physical aspect of this probing action the name “process 1” (von 
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Neumann, p. 351, 418, 421). This process 1 action is not determined, even 
statistically, by the physically described aspects of the theory. 
 
The fact that this choice made by the human observer/agent is not 
determined by the physical state of the universe means that the principle of 
the causal closure of the physical domain is not maintained in contemporary 
basic physical theory. It means also that Kim’s formulation of mind-body 
supervenience is not entailed by contemporary physical theory. That 
formulation asserts that “what happens in our mental life is wholly 
dependent on, and determined by, what happens with our bodily processes  
.” (p. 14)  Kim indicates that supervenience is a common element of all 
physicalist theories. But since supervenience is not required by basic (i.e., 
quantum) physics, the easy way out of the difficulties that have been 
plaguing physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, is simply 
to recognize that the precepts of classical physics, which are the scientific 
source of the notions of the causal closure of the physical, and of 
supervenience, do not hold in real brains, whose activities are influenced 
heavily by quantum processes that require (process 1) inputs that are not 
specified by the (known) physical laws (even statistically).  
 
Before turning to the details of the quantum mechanical treatment of the 
relationship between mind and brain I shall make a few comments on Kim’s 
attempted resolution of the difficulties confronting the classical physicalist 
approach. The essential problem is the mind-body problem. Kim divides this 
problem into two parts, the problem of mental causation and the problem of 
consciousness. The problem of mental causation is: “How can the mind 
exert its causal powers in a world that is fundamentally physical?” (Kim, 
p.7) The problem of consciousness is: “How can there be such a thing as 
consciousness in a physical world, a world consisting ultimately of nothing 
but bits of matter distributed over space-time in accordance with the laws of 
physics.” (Kim, p. 7) 
 
From a modern physics perspective the way to resolve these problems is 
immediately obvious: Simply recognize that the assumption that the laws of 
physics pertain to “bits of matter distributed over space-time in accordance 
with the laws of physics” is false. Indeed, that idea has, for most of the 
twentieth century, been asserted by orthodox physicists to be false, along 
with the assumption that the world is physical in the classical sense. 
Quantum mechanics builds upon the undeniable real existence of our 
streams of conscious experiences, and provides also, as we shall see, a 
 16
natural explanation of their causal power to influence physical properties. 
Thus the difficulties that have beset physicalists for decades, and have led to 
incessant controversies and reformulations, stem, according to the 
perspective achieved by twentieth century physics, directly from the fact that 
the physicalist assumptions not only do not follow from basic precepts of 
physics, but, instead, directly contradict them. The premises of classical 
physicalists have been incredibly out of step with the physics of their day. 
 
Kim’s “physicalist” solution to the problem of the connection between mind 
and brain is essentially to separate a mental reality such as a “pain”, by 
dividing  “being in pain” into “the conscious experience of being in pain” 
and the “state of being in pain”, and allowing the latter to be characterized as 
being caused by certain physically described causes and as causing some 
physically described effects/behaviors. The second part can be physical, and 
hence mind-body “physicalism” is achieved, except for the fact that the first 
part, “the conscious experience of being in pain”, is non-physical and 
epiphenomenal.  Kim claims that this is the best that can be done by way of 
saving mind-body physicalism, but that this is “near enough”. However, the 
epiphenomenal character of our streams of conscious experiences within 
classical-physics-based ontologies has always been the central problem, and 
Kim’s physicalist solution does not solve it. 
 
Kim tries in his chapter 3 to squash the notion that the difficulties with 
physicalism can be avoided by accepting some form of dualism. But the 
dualism that he considers is a Cartesian dualism populated on the mind side 
with mysterious disconnected “souls” whose “essential nature is that they 
are wholly outside the spatial order and lack all spatial properties”. (p. 87). 
However, the experientially described mental entities that occur in quantum 
theory are the basic realities of science. They are the ideas that we are able 
communicate to others pertaining to what we have done and what we have 
learned. These descriptions are essentially descriptions of (parts of) the 
accessible contents of the streams of consciousness of real living observer-
agents. In orthodox quantum mechanics these descriptions are descriptions 
of mental idea-like aspects of real actual events each of which has also a 
physically described aspect that imposes in the realm of potentialities for 
future psycho-physical events the  conditions entailed by the increment in 
knowledge represented by mental aspect. Criticizing dualism in the soul-
based form advanced by Descartes during the seventeenth century instead of 
in the dual-aspect form occurring in contemporary science is an indication 
that philosophers of mind have isolated themselves in a hermetically sealed 
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world, created by considering only what other philosophers of mind have 
said, or are saying, with no opening to the breezes that bring word of the 
highly pertinent revolutionary change that had occurred in basic science 
during the 1920s.  
 
Kim’s chapter 3 is supposed to rule out dualism. But the dualism that he 
mainly addresses is a stark Cartesian (substance) dualism involving “souls” 
existing “outside physical space”. He says “My target will be the 
interactionist dualism of Descartes.” But Quantum mechanics involves a 
certain kind of dualism: it is a dual-aspect theory. In footnote 3 on page 71 
Kim suggests that “dual-aspect” theories are “only variants of property 
dualism.” He says later that “What has become increasingly evident over the 
past thirty years is that mental causation poses insuperable difficulties for all 
forms of mind-body dualism---for property dualism no less than substance 
dualism. …but I believe that if we have learned anything from the three 
decades of debate, it is that unless we bring the supposed mental causes fully 
into the physical world there is no hope of vindicating their status as causes, 
and that the reality of mental causation requires reduction of mentality to 
physical processes, or of minds to brains.” (p.156). He gives on the 
preceding page a supposed way of “generating the problem of mental 
causation for property dualism” without assuming “the causal closure of the 
physical”. But his argument includes an assumption “Given that your finger 
twitching, a physical event, has a full physical cause.” This assumption is 
indeed less than an assumption of full causal closure of the physical, but in 
the quantum mechanical explanation of the way that mind causes bodily 
action the twitching does not have “a fully physical cause.” According to 
quantum mechanics there needs to be a process 1 action mediating the 
connection between the psychologically described cause, a pain in this case, 
and any physical action caused by the pain, and the process 1 action has no 
known or necessary fully physical cause. A quantum mechanical account of 
how consciousness, per se, becomes causally effective is described in 
sections 7 and 8.  
 
Searle also has a problem with dualism. He says: “I am rejecting …any form 
of dualism.   Dualism is usually defined as the view that we live in two 
distinct realms, …the mental and the physical. The problem with dualism is 
that it amounts to giving up on the central enterprise of philosophy. …It 
might turn out, for example, that after our bodies are destroyed, our souls or 
conscious states will float about in a disembodied fashion. But it would be 
giving up on the philosophical (not to mention scientific) enterprise of trying 
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to explain what we know to be real phenomena if we say that they defy 
explanation because they inhabit a separate realm.” (p. 19). 
 
But is dualism (in any form) usually the view that we live in two distinct 
realms? 
 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (T. Honderich, ed.) defines: 
 
Dualism: The theory that mind and matter are two distinct things. (p. 206)  
  
The Blackwell “A Companion to Philosophy of Mind” (S. Guttenplan ed,) 
says: 
 
…the dualist answer is that each person’s mind is at least not identical with 
his body, so these are two different things. (p. 256) 
 
Quantum mechanics allows the physical and mental aspects of a 
psychophysical event to be non-identical, while not saying that real 
phenomena defy explanation because they inhabit a separate realm. Rather it 
explains how conscious mental intentions can, by virtue of the quantum 
mechanical laws themselves, have the intended physically described effects. 
 
 
Philosophers of mind appear to have arrived, today, at less-than-satisfactory 
conclusions to the mind-brain and free will problems, and the difficulties 
seem, prima facie, very closely connected to their acceptance of a known-to-
be-false understanding of the basic nature of the physical world, and of the 
causal role of our conscious thoughts within it.  
 
In the following two sections I shall explain how these difficulties can be 
resolved by accepting an essentially orthodox (von Neumann/Heisenberg) 
quantum mechanical understanding of the mind-body connection. 
 
7. Quantum Mechanics: The Rules of the Game. 
 
7.1 The two basic formulas. 
 
Quantum mechanics is a conceptual structure erected upon a certain kind of 
mathematical description of physical states, and a certain kind of 
phenomenal description of conscious experiences, and upon two basic 
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formulas that connect these two kinds of descriptions. The physically 
described state of the universe, or of any physically describable subsystem, 
is represented by a mathematical structure called a density matrix or 
probability operator. It is usually represented in the theory by the symbol ρ. 
The first basic formula specifies the action upon the prior physical state ρ by 
a process 1 physical action. This physically described action is tied, both 
conceptually and causally, to an associated “free choice of probing action 
described in everyday language, refined by the concepts of classical physical 
theory”. An elementary process 1 action partitions the prior state ρ into two 
distinct non-interfering parts.  
 
ρ ? P ρ P + P’ ρ P’      (P’= 1-P) 
 
The first part, P ρ P, is associated with the occurrence/appearance of a pre-
specified, possible, perceptually identifiable outcome ‘Yes’. The other part 
is associated with a failure of that ‘Yes’ outcome to occur/appear.  
 
The symbol P represents an operator that satisfies PP=P. Such an operator 
is called a projection operator.  
 
The quantum game is like “twenty questions”: the observer-agent “freely 
poses” a question with an identifiable answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, This question, 
and the process 1 probing action corresponding to it, are represented in the 
mathematical formalism by a projection operator P.  Nature then returns an 
answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The probability that the experienced answer is ‘Yes’ 
is given by the basic probability formula of quantum mechanics:  
 
< P > = Trace P ρ P /Trace ρ. 
 
The “Trace” operation acting upon an operator X, which is conceived of as 
an action that acts on whatever stands on its right,  is the instruction: “Let X 
act back around upon itself!” The result is always a number. [For a detailed 
explanation of the mathematical meaning and workings of the above basic 
formulas see: http://arXiv.org/abs/0803.1625] 
  
These two formulas constitute the foundation of the quantum mechanical 
rules for predicting certain statistical connections between: (1), the aspects 
of our conscious experiences that are described in the language that we use 
to describe to ourselves and to others the perceptual contents of our streams 
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of conscious experiences; and (2), the aspects that are described in the 
mathematical formalism of quantum physics.    
 
7.2 Classical Description. 
 
“…we must recognize above all that, even when phenomena transcend the 
scope of classical physical theories, the account of the experimental 
arrangement and the recording of observations must be given in plain 
language, suitably supplemented by technical physical terminology. This is a 
clear logical demand, since the very word “experiment” refers to a situation 
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned.” 
(Bohr7, p. 72) 
 
“…it is imperative to realize that in every account of physical experience 
one must describe both experimental conditions and observations by the 
same means of communication as the one used in classical physics.” (Bohr7, 
p. 88) 
 
This demand that we must use the known-to-be-fundamentally-false 
concepts of classical physical theories as a fundamental part of quantum 
mechanics has often been cited as the logical incongruity that lies at the root 
of the difficulties in arriving at a rationally coherent understanding of 
quantum mechanics: i.e., of an understanding that goes beyond merely 
understanding how to use it in practice. So I will consider next the problem 
of reconciling the quantum and classical concepts, within the context of a 
quantum theory of the mind-brain connection. 
 
7.3 Quasi-Classical States of the Electromagnetic Field 
 
There is one part of quantum theory in which a particularly tight and 
beautiful connection is maintained between classical mechanics and 
quantum mechanics. This is the simple harmonic operator (SHO). With a 
proper choice of units the energy (or Hamiltonian) of the system has the 
simple quadratic form E = H= ½ (p2   +  q 2), where q and p are the coordinate 
and momentum variables in the classical case, and are the corresponding 
operators in the quantum case. In the classical case the trajectory of the 
“particle” is a circle in q-p space of radius r = (2E)1/2. The angular velocity is 
constant and independent of E, and in these special units is ω = 1: one 
radian per unit of time. The lowest-energy classical state is represented by a 
point at rest at the “origin”  q = p = 0.  
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The lowest-energy quantum state ρ is the projection operator P 
corresponding to a Gaussian wave function that in coordinate space is  
ψ(q) = C exp(─ (½)q2) and in momentum space is   
ψ(p) = C exp(─ (½ )p2), where C is 21/4.  If this ground state is shifted in q-
p space by a displacement (Q, P) one obtains  a state---i.e., a projection 
operator---P[Q,P], which has the following important property: if one allows 
this quantum state to evolve in accordance with the quantum mechanical 
equations of motion then it will evolve into the trjectory of states P[Q(t),P(t)], 
where the (center) point (Q(t), P(t)) moves on a circular trajectory that is 
identical to the one followed by the classical point particle.  
 
If one puts a macroscopic amount of energy E into this quantum state then it 
becomes “essentially the same as” the corresponding classical state. Thus if 
the energy E in this one degree of freedom is the energy per degree of 
freedom at body temperature then the quantum state, instead of being 
confined to an exact point (Q(t), P(t)) lying on a circle of (huge) radius r = 
107 in q-p space, will be effectively confined, due to the Gaussian fall-off of 
the wave functions, to a disc of unit radius centered at that point (Q(t), P(t)). 
Given two such states, P[Q,.P], and P[Q’,P’],  their overlap, defined by the Trace 
of the product of these two projection operators, is exp(─ (½ )d2), where d 
is the distance between their center points. On this 107 scale the unit size of 
the quantum state becomes effectively zero. And if the energy of this 
classical SHO state is large on the thermal scale then its motion, as defined 
by the time evolution of the projection operator P[P(t),Q(t)], will be virtually 
independent of the effects of both environmental decoherence, which arises 
from subtle quantum-phase effects, and thermal noise, for reasons essentially 
the same as the reasons for the negligibility these effects on the classically 
describable motion of the pendulum on a grandfather clock. 
 
Notice that the quantum state, P[Q,.P],  is completely specified by the 
corresponding classical state (Q, P): the quantum mechanical spread away 
from this point is not only very tiny on the classical scale; it is also 
completely fixed: the width of the Gaussian wave packet associated with our 
Hamiltonian is fixed, and independent of both the energy and phase of the 
SHO.  
 
We are interested here in brain dynamics. Everyone admits that at the most 
basic dynamical level the brain must be treated as a quantum system: the 
classical laws fail at the atomic level. This dynamics rests upon myriads of 
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microscopic processes, including flows of ions into nerve terminals.  These 
atomic-scale processes must in principle be treated quantum mechanically. 
But the effect of accepting the quantum description at the microscopic level 
is to inject quantum uncertainties/indeterminacies at this level. Yet 
introducing even small uncertainties/indeterminacies at microscopic levels 
into these nonlinear systems possessing lots of releasable stored chemical 
energy has a strong tendency---the butterfly effect---to produce very large 
macroscopic effects later on. Massive parallel processing at various stages 
may have a tendency to reduce these indeterminacies, but it is pure wishful 
thinking to believe that these indeterminacies can be completely eliminated 
in all cases, thereby producing brains that are completely deterministic at the 
macroscopic level. Some of the microscopic quantum indeterminacy must at 
least occasionally make its way up to the macroscopic level.  
 
According to the precepts of orthodox quantum mechanics, these 
macroscopic quantum uncertainties are resolved by means of process 1 
interventions, whose forms are not specified by the quantum state of the 
universe, or any part thereof. In actual practice, what happens is determined 
by conscious choices “for which the quantum mechanical formalism offers 
the appropriate latitude”. No way has yet been discovered by quantum 
theorists to circumvent this need for some sort of intervention that is not 
determined by the orthodox physical laws of quantum physics. In particular, 
environmental decoherence effects certainly do not, by themselves, resolve 
this problem of reconciling the quantum indeterminacy, which irrepressibly 
bubbles up from the microscopic levels of brain dynamics, with the 
essentially classical character of our descriptions of our experiences of 
“what we have done and what we have learned”. 
 
The huge importance of the existence and properties of the quasi-classical 
quantum states of SHOs is this: If the projection operators P associated with 
our experiences are projection operators of the kind that instantiate these 
quasi-classical states then we can rationally reconcile the demand that the 
dynamics of our brains be fundamentally quantum mechanical with the 
demand that our descriptions of our experiences of “what we have done and 
what we have learned” be essentially classical. This arrangement would be a 
natural upshot of the fact that our experiences would then correspond to the 
actualization of strictly quantum states that are both specified by classical 
states, and whose behaviors closely mimic the properties of their classical 
counterparts, apart from the fact that they represent only potentialities, and 
hence will be subject, just like Schroedinger’ macroscopic cat, to the actions 
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of the projection operators associated with our probing actions. This 
quantum aspect entails that, by virtue of the quantum Zeno effect, which 
follows from the basic quantum formula that connects our conceptually 
described observations to physically described quantum jumps, we can 
understand dynamically how our conscious choices can affect our 
subsequent thoughts and actions: we can rationally explain, by using the 
basic principles of orthodox contemporary physics, the causal efficacy of our 
conscious thoughts in the physical world, and thereby dissolve the 
physicalists’ dilemma.  
 
I shall now describe in a little more detail how this works. 
 
 
8. The Mind-Brain Connection. 
 
The general features of this quantum mechanical approach to the mind-brain 
problem have been described in several prior publications9-12 . In this section 
I will present a specific model based on the general ideas described in those 
publications, but that adds some specifications pertaining to the quantum-
classical connection.. 
 
Mounting empirical evidence13,14 suggests that our conscious experiences are 
connected to brain states in which measurable components of the 
electromagnetic field located in spatially well separated parts of the brain are 
oscillating with the same frequency, and in phase synchronization. The 
model being proposed here assumes, accordingly, that the brain correlate of 
each conscious experience is an EM (electromagnetic) excitation of this 
kind. More specifically, each process 1 probing action is represented 
quantum mechanically in terms of a projection operator that is the quasi-
classical counterpart of such an oscillating component of a classical EM 
field. 
 
The central idea of this quantum approach to the mind-brain problem is that 
each process 1 intervention is the physical aspect of a psycho-physical event 
whose psychologically described aspect is the conscious experience of 
intending to do, or choosing to do, some physical or mental action. The 
physical aspect of the ‘Yes’ answer to this probing event is the actualization, 
by means of a quantum reduction event, of a pattern of brain activity called a 
“template for action”. A template for action for some action X is a pattern of 
physical (brain) activity which if held in place for a sufficiently long time 
 24
will tend to cause the action X to occur. The psycho-physical linkage 
between the felt conscious intent and the linked template for action is 
supposed to be established by trial and error learning. 
 
A prerequisite for trial and error learning of this kind is that mental effort be 
causally efficacious in the physically described world. Only if conscious 
choices and efforts have consequences in the physically described world can 
an appropriate correlation connecting the mental and physical aspects of 
events be mechanically established by trial and error learning.  With no such 
connection the physical action could become completely disconnected from 
the associated conscious intent with no adverse consequences..  
 
The feature of quantum mechanics that allows a person’s conscious choices 
to influence that person’s physically described brain process in the needed 
way is the so-called “Quantum Zeno Effect”. This quantum effect entails 
that if a sequence of very similar process 1 probing actions occur in 
sufficiently rapid succession then the affected component of the physical 
state will be forced, with high probability, to be, at the particular sequence of 
times ti at which the probing actions are made, exactly the sequence of states 
specified by the sequence of projection operators Ph(ti) that specify the ‘Yes’ 
outcomes of the sequence of process 1 actions. That is, the affected 
component of the brain state---for example some template for action---will 
be forced, with high probability, to evolve in lock step with a sequence of 
‘Yes’ outcomes of a sequence of “freely chosen” process 1 actions, where 
“freely chosen” means that these process 1 actions are not determined, via 
any known law, by the physically described state of the universe! This 
coercion of a physically described aspect of a brain process to evolve in lock 
step with the ‘Yes’ answers to a sequence of process 1 probing actions that 
are free of any known physically described coercion, but that seem to us to 
be freely chosen by our mental processes, is what will presently be 
demonstrated. It allows physically un-coerced conscious choices to affect a 
physically described process that will, by virtue of the basic quantum 
probability formula, have intended experiential consequences.  
 
In this model, the repetition rate (attention density) of the sequence of 
process 1 actions is assumed to be controlled by conscious effort. In 
particular, in the model where the projection operators P(ti) are projection 
operators P[Q(ti), P(ti)]---[I have now raised to on-line the arguments that in 
Chapter 7 I wrote as subscripts]---the presumption is that the size of the 
intervals (ti+1  ─ ti) are under the control of the psychological aspect of the 
 25
probing action. This is in line with the general assumption that some of the 
details of the process 1 probing actions are at least partly under control of 
the associated stream of consciousness. This postulated influence of 
consciousness upon the timings of the events is the only influence granted to 
mind by this model. All other features of the events are assumed to be 
specified in some way by the physically described conditions. 
 
I describe the quantum properties of the EM field in the formulation of 
relativistic quantum field theory developed by Tomonaga and by Schwinger, 
which generalizes the idea of the Schroedinger equation to the case of the 
electromagnetic field. One can imagine space to be cut up into very tiny 
regions, in each of which the values of the six numbers that define the 
electric and magnetic fields in that region are defined. In case the field in 
that region is executing simple harmonic oscillations we can imagine that 
each of the six values is moving in a potential well that produces the motion 
of a SHO. If the process 1 action is specified by a projection operator P 
corresponding to a ‘Yes’ state that is a coordinated synchronous oscillation 
of the EM field in many regions, {R1 , R2 , R3 , …} then this state, if 
represented quantum mechanically, consists of some quasi-classical state 
P[Q1, P1  ] in R1 , and some quasi-classical state P[Q2, P2] in R2, and some 
quasi-classical P[Q3 , P3 ] in R3 , etc..  The state P of this combination is the 
product of these P[Qi , Pi]s, each of which acts in its own SHO space, and 
acts like the unit operator (i.e., unity or ‘one’) in all the other spaces. This 
product of Pn s, all evaluated at time ti, is the Ph(ti ) that is the brain aspect of 
the ‘Yes’ answer to the process 1 query that occurs at time ti . The quantum 
frequency of the state represented by this Ph(ti ) is the sum of the quantum 
frequencies of the individual regions, and is the total number of quanta in the 
full set of SHOs. However, the period of the periodic motion of the classical 
EM field remains 2π, in the chosen units, independently of how many 
regions are involved, or how highly excited the states of the SHOs in the 
various regions become. This smaller frequency is the only one that the 
classical state knows about: it is the frequency that characterizes the features 
of brain dynamics observed in EEG and MEG measurements. 
 
The sequence of Ph(ti)s that is honed into observer/agent’s structure by trial 
and error learning is a sequence of Ph(ti)s that occurs when the SHO template 
for action is held in place (via the quantum Zeno effect) by effort. Learning 
is achieved by effort, which increases attention density, and holds the 
template for action in place during learning. Thus if H0 is the Hamiltonian 
that maintains this SHO motion then for the honed sequence 
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Ph(ti+1) = exp (─ iH0 (ti+1  ─ ti)) Ph(ti) exp (iH0(ti+1  ─ ti)). 
 
But in the application situation there may be disturbing physical influences 
that tend to cause a deviation from the learned SHO motion. Suppose that on 
the time scale of (ti+1  ─ ti ) the disturbance is small, so that the perturbed 
evolution starting from Ph(ti) can be expressed in the form 
 
 
P(ti+1) = exp (─iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)) exp (─ iH0 (ti+1  ─ ti)) Ph(ti)  
              exp (iH0(ti+1  ─ ti)) exp ( iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)) 
 
          = exp (─iHi (ti+1  ─ ti))) Ph(ti+1) exp ( iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)) 
 
where  Hi is bounded.  
 
According to the basic probability formula, the probability that this state 
P(ti+1)  will be found, if measured/observed, to be in the state Ph(ti+1) at 
time ti+1 is (using Trace Ph(ti) = 1) 
 
Trace Ph(ti+1) exp (─iHi (ti+1  ─ ti))) Ph(ti+1) exp ( iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)). 
 
Inserting the leading and first order terms [ 1± iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)] in the power 
series expansion of  exp ( ± iHi (ti+1  ─ ti)) and using PP= P, and the fact that 
Trace AB = Trace BA, for all A and B, one finds that the term linear in  
(ti+1  ─ ti) vanishes identically.  
 
The vanishing of the term linear in (ti+1  ─ ti ) is the basis of the quantum 
Zeno effect. If one considers some finite time interval and divides it into 
small intervals (ti+1  ─ ti ) and looks at a product of factors (1 + c(ti+1 ─ti )n ), 
then if n is bigger than one the product will tend to unity (one) as  the size of 
the intervals (ti+1  ─ ti ) tend to zero. But this means that, if the initial answer 
is ‘Yes’, then the basic probability formula of quantum mechanics entails 
that, as the step sizes (ti+1  ─ ti)  tend to zero, the evolving state of the 
system being probed by the sequence of probing action will have a 
probability that tends to one (unity) to evolve in lock step with the set of 
‘Yes’ answer, specified by the sequence of projection operators Ph(ti) 
 27
associated with the previously learned action. The power to influence only 
the timings of the process 1 actions confers upon consciousness the power to 
institute previously learned actions. These physically efficacious “attention 
densities” are not determined by the laws of orthodox quantum theory, and 
hence they can be, as they seem to be, influenced by consciousness per se.  
 
The point of his derivation is that it is expressed in terms of brain states that 
are macroscopic, and that correspond to classically describable states of the 
electromagnetic field measured by EEG and MEG procedures. Even though 
these states contain huge amounts of energy, nevertheless, if we accept the 
principle that the underlying brain dynamics must in principle be treated 
quantum mechanically, and, accordingly, replace these classical states by 
their quasi-classical counterparts, which represent potentialities that are 
related to experience only via the basic quantum formulas, then the 
principles of orthodox (von Neumann/Heisenberg) quantum mechanics 
themselves provide a rationally coherent way of understanding the mind-
brain connection in a way that escapes the horns of the physicalists’ 
dilemma: it gives each person’s conscious intentions the power to causally 
influence the course of events in his or her quantum mechanically described 
brain in a way that serves these intentions. 
  
A further development and discussion of the mathematical details can be 
found in reference 15. 
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